Museo di Sant'Agostino | Musei di Genova


 

Museo di Sant'Agostino | Musei di Genova


ontology of music stringontology of musicartistic creation coalesces with this primordial artist of the world, does he know anything of the eternal essence of art (BT 5).  


That primordial
artist is, of course, the plane of immanence of nature itself. And composition
of this sort is “imitation of nature not a reproduction of nature actual
forms but an imitation of its virtual power, or, as Cage often put it, imitation of nature in her manner of operation(see Cage in Cox and Warner




2004; on this notion of “imitation of nature” as the imitation of the “art




impulses of nature” see BT 2). Since the mid-twentieth century the experiments




of Varèse, Schaeffer, Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, and others have given rise to




a new sonic or audio culture that considers music-sound as a natural flow on a




par with other such flows (geological, genetic, linguistic, etc.). In the noise




composition of Merzbow, the concrète performances of Francisco López, the




soundscape recordings of Chris Watson, and the electronic signals that course




through the work of Carl Michael von Hausswolff and Kaffe Matthews, and in so




much experimental music today is disclosed the field of musical becoming, the




virtual domain of music that, in his first book, Nietzsche called “Dionysian.”




Like the white noise of the seashore in which Leibniz and Deleuze heard the




Dionysian, experimental music today offers “a musical mirror of the world” (BT




6): an aural image of the distinct-obscure world of natural becoming, the




dissonant play of forces that makes possible the world of empirical particulars.




Music, Science, and the Interpretation of Existence (Reprise) With this, we can




finally return to and unpack the passage with which we began. Recall that, in GS




373, Nietzsche criticizes “scholars” for “never catching sight of the really




great problems and question marks.” Among these scholars, he singles out




“mechanistic material scientists” for their merely “human” horizons,




interpretations, and perspectives. Such interpretations take the world to be




composed solely of discrete, sensible, and quantifiable entities. And they take




natural change to be a matter of the causal interactions of these entities. Such




positivist, reductionist, and mechanistic interpretations, Nietzsche insists,




are superficial, stupid, meaningless, and worthless. A the end of the passage,




he briefly notes that music provides a potent counter-example, asserting that,




insofar as it cannot account for music, positivist and mechanist science fails




to provide an adequate interpretation of the world. At the outset, I urged that




we take this musical example to be making not merely a phenomenological point or




a point about aesthetic value, but a deep ontological claim about the way the




world is. Here, as elsewhere, Nietzsche is urging us “to look at science in the




perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life” (BT, “Self-Criticism,”




2), arguing that aesthetic interpretations of the world are better, richer, and




more naturalistic than scientific ones. More specifically, I take him to be




pointing back to his thesis in 510 christoph cox The Birth of Tragedy that music




is an ontological echo that provides us with an aural representation of the very




nature of things. What music shows us, I have argued, is that the domain of




individuated, actualized, fully constituted, empirical subjects and objects is




premised on the domain of becoming: a virtual, transcendental realm of




differential forces. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche calls this domain the




Dionysian. Such a domain precedes and exceeds the horizon of the human and calls




for a “transcendental empiricism in contrast with everything that makes up the




world of the subject and the object” (Deleuze 2001: 25). Aptly enough, the




symbol of Dionysus is the satyr, “that synthesis of god and billy goat” (BT,




“Self-Criticism,” 4), a creature at once post- and pre-human. Tragedy




(literally, goat-song) affirms nature and becoming as virtual powers that




generate and supersede the human along with every other actual entity.




“Dionysian art,” Nietzsche writes, wishes to convince us of the eternal joy of




existence: only we are to seek this joy not in phenomena, but behind them. We




are to recognize that all that comes into being must be ready for a sorrowful




end; we are forced to look into the terrors of the individual existence â€" yet we




are not to become rigid with fear: a metaphysical comfort14 tears us momentarily




away from the bustle of the changing figures. We are really for a brief moment




primordial being itself, feeling its raging desire for existence and joy in




existence; the struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena, now appear




necessary to us, in view of the excess of countless forms of existence which




force and push one another into life, in view of the exuberant fertility of the




universal will. (BT 17) Gay Science 373, then, offers an ontology, an ontology




alternative to the ontology of positivistic science, an ontology guided by




music, which, Nietzsche suggests, provides an image of natural becoming or, in




other words, “will to power” as a “pre-form of life.” The passage perhaps




invites the objection that Nietzsche, the perspectivist, has no right to offer




such an account of the way the world really is. To which Nietzsche would no




doubt respond, as he does in another passage in which he presents the will to




power as an interpretation counter to that of mechanistic science: “Supposing




that this also is only interpretation â€" and you will be eager enough to make




this objection? â€" well, so much the better” (BGE 22). See also 3 “The Aesthetic




Justification of Existence”; 6 “Nietzsche’s ‘Gay’ Science”; 8 “Nietzsche’s




Philosophy and True Religion”; 9 “The Naturalisms of Beyond Good and Evil”; 12




“Nietzsche on Time and Becoming”; 30 “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will to Power”




Notes I thank Keith Ansell Pearson for insightful comments and suggestions that




prompted this essay and shaped its argument, and Daniel W. Smith for helpful




comments along the way. 1 This term is only suggested in the passage. Yet




Nietzsche first introduces the term Ãœbermensch earlier in The Gay Science




(§143); and Book V, in which GS 373 appears, was added in 1887, following the




publication of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which the Ãœbermensch is a central




figure. 511 nietzsche, dionysus, and the ontology of music 2 The argument that




art trumps science is a key feature of The Birth of Tragedy and remains




important throughout Nietzsche’s corpus. See e.g. BT, “Self-Criticism,” and GM




III. 25. For more on this issue, see Cox 1999: ch. 1, esp. pp. 63â€"8. 3 In the




literal, etymological sense in which Nietzsche often uses this term: meta:




beyond or above; physics: nature. 4 For a more sustained anti-Hegelian reading




of The Birth of Tragedy, see Deleuze 1983. 5 For Nietzsche, “being” has two




related meanings. On the one hand, it names distinct and subsistent empirical




particulars, individual entities. On the other hand, it names metaphysical




entities that are not affected by becoming or change. As a naturalist,




Nietzsche holds that there is only becoming and change and, hence, that,




strictly speaking, there are no autonomous, subsistent empirical particulars.




The illusion of empirical beings, Nietzsche holds, is due in part to the




Platonist projection of metaphysical being into the empirical. 6 This notion of




“unity” or “unit-hood” (Einheit) is surely different from that of the




“primordial unity” (Ur-Eine) spoken of in The Birth of Tragedy. The former




clearly refers to the (Apollonian) illusion of unity and individuation




characteristic of empirical beings, while the latter refers to the




indistinctness characteristic of the realm of becoming or the Dionysian. Aware




of this potential confusion, the later Nietzsche qualifies his talk of becoming




and the Dionysian as “unities,” describing them instead as continuums or




multiplicities. 7 For a rich, Deleuzian and Nietzschean

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